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Abstract 
 
In recent years, broadband providers have introduced data caps and other plans that charge 
customers based on use. While regulators have generally approved of this shift, some consumer 
groups fear that usage-based pricing will lead to higher prices and deteriorating service. They 
also fear data caps allow companies like Comcast to protect their cable businesses from upstarts 
like Netflix.  
 
This article evaluates the merits of data caps and other usage-based pricing strategies. Usage-
based pricing shifts more network costs onto heavier Internet users. This can reduce costs for 
others and make broadband more accessible to low-income consumers. Usage-based pricing can 
also reduce network congestion. While data caps can be used to hurt competition, antitrust law 
teaches that regulators should intervene only if consumers suffer harm and cannot switch Internet 
providers. Otherwise, broadband providers should be free to experiment with different pricing 
strategies to compete for customers and fund future network upgrades. 
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Introduction 
The United States is in the midst of an explosion in Internet content and applications. In 
2011 alone, Internet traffic in the United States grew 52 percent over the previous year, reaching 
a volume twelve times greater than the entire US Internet in 2005.1 Peak-time traffic grew even 
faster,2 driven by the rising popularity of bandwidth-intensive real-time entertainment such as 
Netflix, which by itself generates nearly one-third of all downstream traffic during peak hours.3 
And that growth will continue for the foreseeable future: network equipment giant Cisco 
Systems expects US Internet traffic to nearly triple between now and 2016.4 Globally, more data 
will traverse the Internet in 2016 than in every year from 1984 through 2012 combined.5 
This steady growth in demand, and the continuing capital investment required to meet it, 
has prompted broadband providers to reconsider the flat-rate pricing model that has dominated 
the Internet access market since the late 1990s. Flat-rate, or all-you-can-eat pricing, has proven 
popular with consumers, primarily because such plans are simple and predictable. Customers 
know with certainty that broadband access will be the same fixed cost each month, and can use 
the Internet without worrying about how each online activity marginally affects the family 
                                                 
1 Cisco VNI Forecast Highlights, available at 
http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/sp/vni/vni_forecast_highlights/index.html (last visited August 22, 2012). (“In 
the United States, average Internet traffic grew 52% in 2011... Internet traffic will be 190 Petabytes per day in 2011, 
up from 125 Petabytes per day in 2010…U.S. Internet traffic in 2011 was equivalent to 12x the volume of the entire 
U.S. Internet in 2005.”) 
2 Id. (“In the United States, peak Internet traffic grew 60% in 2011.”)  
3 Sandvine Global Internet Phenomena Report Fall 2011, at 7 (32.7 percent). Sandvine defines peak time as the 
period within which aggregate network traffic is within 5 percent of its highest daily value. On an average day, the 
peak time for downstream Internet traffic in North American fixed networks is roughly from 9 until 11:30 p.m. Id. at 
5. Sandvine estimates that peak times are becoming shorter but more intense, as “subscribers are concentrating the 
same amount of activity within an increasingly narrow slice of time.” Id. As discussed below, peak times on wireless 
networks are more varied and unpredictable. 
4 VNI Forecast Highlights, supra note 1. (“In the United States, Internet traffic will grow 2.8-fold from 2011 to 
2016... Internet traffic will be 533 Petabytes per day in 2016, up from 190 Petabytes per day in 2011… Peak Internet 
traffic will grow 3.1-fold.”)  
5 See Robert Pepper, Mobile Networks in a Zettabyte World: Trends from Cisco’s Visual Networking Index, June 
2012, at 3 (“By 2016, global IP traffic will reach an annual run rate of 1.3 zettabytes per year…More traffic will 
traverse global networks than from the beginning of the Internet to today [] combined. 1984-2012: 1.2 zettabytes.”), 
available at http://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Dr_Robert-_Pepper_Cisco_Public_Policy-
Forum_Data_Demand.pdf (last visited August 22, 2012).  
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budget. But flat-rate unlimited use can also create inefficient network operation. Because price is 
not tied to online use, consumers have no financial incentive to economize their use of 
bandwidth. Instead, network costs are spread evenly throughout the customer base, forcing light 
Internet users to subsidize the data-intensive lifestyles of their heavier-use counterparts. 
To address these inefficiencies, broadband providers have begun experimenting with 
alternative pricing strategies. This movement is most visible in the wireless industry, where the 
smartphone revolution grew much faster than providers expected. Smartphone use, in turn, 
spawned a new industry in mobile content and applications and caused wireless broadband 
demand to outstrip capacity on most networks (a phenomenon sometimes called the “iPhone 
effect”).6 Tiered pricing has now become the norm in wireless broadband, where consumers face 
a wide range of potential pricing options.7 Many residential fixed broadband providers have also 
explored uniform monthly data caps and overage charges for subscribers. 
While regulators8 and many academics9 have largely supported this shift, many public 
interest groups have reacted with skepticism.10 Groups such as Public Knowledge and Free Press 
                                                 
6 Crystal Lyons, Data Caps—Opportunities and Concerns for Developers, available at 
http://bostinno.com/channels/data-caps-opportunities-and-concerns-for-developers/ (last visited August 22, 2012). 
7 See, e.g., Rene Ritchie, AT&T Adds Data Caps, Changes Rates for iPhone Plans, Will Support Tethering for Extra 
Charge, June 2, 2010, available at http://www.imore.com/2010/06/02/att-adds-data-caps-rates-iphone-plans-plans-
support-tethering/ (last visited May 30, 2012). 
8 Yinka Adegoke, FCC Boss Backs Usage-Based Pricing for Cable Internet Access, May 22, 2012, available at 
http://bottomline.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/22/11815105-fcc-boss-backs-usage-based-pricing-for-cable-
internet-access?lite (last accessed May 22, 2012); Michael Turk, Public Policy Discussion with FTC and FCC 
Commissioners, available at http://blog.thecableshow.com/2011/06/15/public-policy-discussion-with-ftc-and-fcc-
commissioners/. 
9 Hearing on Net Neutrality Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of Professor Lawrence Lessig) (“I believe, for example, that consumer-tiering should be encouraged.”); 
Cecilia Kang, Comcast Illegally Interfered with Web File-Sharing Traffic, FCC Says, Washington Post, July 30, 
2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/29/AR2008072902077.html (last 
visited May 28, 2012), quoting Professor Timothy Wu, who describes usage-based pricing as “probably the fairest 
system going.” 
10 See, e.g., Andrew Odlyzko et al., Know Your Limits: Considering the Role of Data Caps and Usage Based Billing 
in Internet Access Service, Public Knowledge White Paper, May 2012; Letter from Free Press, Consumers Union, 
Public Knowledge, and New America Foundation to Senator John D. Rockefeller and Senator Kay Bailey 
Hutchison, April 23, 2012, available at http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-
legacy/PI_letter_Senate_Commerce_OVDtrends_Apr2012_FINAL.pdf (last visited August 22, 2012). 
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fear that broadband providers are using data caps to pad profits and avoid the cost of future 
network upgrades. They also allege that fixed broadband providers may use data caps to shield 
their cable businesses from Internet-based competitors, an allegation seemingly strengthened by 
Comcast’s recent decision to exempt its Xfinity app from its data cap in certain circumstances.11 
Interest groups asked the Senate to consider these issues as part of an April 2012 hearing on the 
future of video.12 More recently, the Justice Department has begun investigating whether these 
data caps violate antitrust law.13 
This article explores the implications of this trend toward usage-based pricing. It finds 
that data caps and other forms of metered consumption are not inherently anti-consumer or 
anticompetitive. Rather, they reflect different pricing strategies through which a broadband 
company may recover its costs from its customer base and fund future infrastructure investment. 
By aligning costs more closely with use, usage-based pricing may effectively shift more network 
costs onto those consumers who use the network the most. Companies can thus avoid forcing 
light Internet users to subsidize the data-heavy habits of online gamers and movie torrenters. 
Usage-based pricing may also help alleviate network congestion by encouraging customers, 
content providers, and network operators to use broadband more efficiently. 
Opponents of usage-based pricing have noted that data caps may be deployed for 
anticompetitive purposes. But data caps can be a problem only when a firm with market power 
exploits that power in a way that harms consumers. Absent a specific market failure, which 
critics have not yet shown, broadband providers should be free to experiment with usage-based 
                                                 
11 See Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 47. As discussed in greater detail below, this concern was brought into sharp 
focus when Comcast announced that customers who subscribe to both broadband and the company’s Xfinity cable 
service would be permitted to watch Xfinity using an app on the Microsoft Xbox without incurring charges against 
the customer’s data cap, even though Netflix and other Internet-based video streamed through the Xbox would be 
counted against the customer’s cap. See Public Knowledge, Petition to Enforce Merger Conditions, Federal 
Communications Commission (filed August 1, 2012).  
12 Letter from Free Press et al., supra note 10. 
13 Cecilia Kang, Justice Department Probes Limits on Web Data, Washington Post, June 14, 2012, at A16. 
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pricing and other pricing strategies as tools in their arsenal to meet rising broadband demand. 
Public policies allowing providers the freedom to experiment best preserve the spirit of 
innovation that has characterized the Internet since its inception.  
I. The Shift to Usage-Based Pricing in Broadband Markets 
A. A Taxonomy of Usage-Based Pricing 
Usage-based pricing is an umbrella term for any billing system that charges on the basis 
of consumption. Although Internet access providers abandoned usage-based pricing early in the 
industry’s history,14 it is common in many other network industries. In its simplest form, known 
as metering, the firm charges a basic fee per unit consumed. For example, historically telephone 
companies such as AT&T and Sprint charged a certain rate per minute for long-distance calls. 
The price per minute became a high-profile point of competition between these carriers.15  
In more sophisticated variations, companies can use metered pricing to induce particular 
customer behavior. Many companies offer a per-unit discount on purchases above a certain 
volume, to encourage greater consumption. Alternatively, some utilities such as water companies 
charge a higher rate per unit after consumption reaches a certain threshold, to encourage 
conservation and penalize customers who draw more than their neighbors from the common 
pool.16 Some electricity utilities, facing above-capacity demand during peak times, charge a 
different rate per kilowatt-hour for peak and non-peak electricity use, hoping to induce customers 
                                                 
14 During the early 1990s, dial-up Internet providers typically offered Internet access at a per-minute rate. This 
changed in 1996, when industry leader America Online changed to a flat-rate, unlimited use pricing model. The 
company was initially unprepared for the increased demand generated by the shift, which led to numerous blackouts 
and busy signals. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 975, 986 (2006), citing Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time 
Warner 84 (2004). But the move nonetheless proved popular with consumers, leading competitors to follow suit. As 
dial-up yielded to higher-capacity broadband networks, competitors retained the unlimited flat-fee model. 
15 See, e.g., Edward Cavanaugh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 87 OR. L. REV. 147, 198 (2005), discussing long-
distance competition in the wake of the 1984 breakup of the AT&T monopoly. 
16 See Scott Wallsten, Managing the Network? Rethink Prices, Not Net Neutrality, Progress & Freedom Foundation 
Snapshot, October 2007, at 3. 
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to shift nonessential consumption. Similarly, wireless companies famously offered free nights 
and weekends to customers, partly to shift call volumes to periods when the telephone network 
was underutilized.  
Alternatively, some companies may adopt a two-part tariff, wherein the customer pays a 
fixed rate per month for access to the network and an additional fee per unit for consumption on 
that network. Two-part tariffs are attractive to network industries because the fixed fee ensures 
that all customers contribute in some measure toward common network costs, while the per-unit 
fee recovers marginal costs efficiently, and can also shift some network costs onto heavier users. 
Tiered pricing is one form of a two-part tariff that is common in the wireless telephone industry. 
Under tiered pricing, customers could choose among wireless plans, each of which offered a 
certain number of minutes per month at a fixed rate. Each customer received unrestricted calling 
each month up to his or her plan limit, and then incurred an additional per-minute charge for 
consumption exceeding that threshold.  
B. Usage-Based Pricing for Fixed Broadband Service 
In the fixed broadband market, data caps are the most common form of usage-based 
pricing. The data cap is one way in which a two-part tariff can apply in the broadband industry. 
A consumer typically purchases a fixed number of gigabytes that he or she may consume 
monthly, often followed by some penalty if the consumer exceeds the cap.17 Comcast adopted a 
250-gigabyte monthly cap on residential broadband customers in 2008.18 The company sent 
                                                 
17 The price of this service often varies based upon the customer’s preferred top speeds, which is another form of 
usage-based pricing that lies largely outside the scope of this article. 
18 See Comcast Corporation, Announcement regarding an Amendment to Our Acceptable Use Policy, August 28, 
2008, available at http://xfinity.comcast.net/terms/network/amendment/ (last visited May 20, 2012). The policy took 
effect on October 1, 2008. This change came shortly after the Federal Communications Commission sanctioned the 
company for secretly degrading peer-to-peer networking traffic as a method of managing network congestion. See 
Formal Compl. of Free Press & Public Knowledge against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer 
Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). As a 
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letters to customers who exceeded the cap19 and reserved the right to terminate service to repeat 
offenders,20 though it is unclear how often it actually did so.21  
Shortly thereafter, Time Warner Cable experimented with a much lower data cap and 
overage charge in some markets, but canceled the pilot program after negative customer 
feedback. 22 AT&T and CenturyLink have also adopted data caps,23 although Verizon has not. In 
May 2012, Comcast eliminated its 250-gigabyte cap, but intends to implement a soft cap of 300 
gigabytes in the near future, with a per-gigabyte overage charge for exceeding the cap.24  
Of course, the effectiveness of a data cap depends significantly on customers’ 
understanding of how much data their online activities consume, and how close they come to the 
cap each month. A recent Sandvine report on network use states that the mean monthly data 
                                                                                                                                                             
result, many commenters have suggested Comcast adopted its data cap to solve the congestion problems caused by 
peer-to-peer traffic, although Comcast did not explicitly make this connection. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Public Knowledge, a public interest group that has challenged data caps, has profiled Andre Vrignaud, a gaming 
consultant whose access was terminated after he exceeded the cap for two consecutive months in 2011. See Odlyzko 
et al., supra note 10, at 3-4. Vrignaud claimed his excessive use stemmed from his reliance on cloud-based storage. 
See Ryan Singel, Comcast Bans Seattle Man from Internet for his Cloudy Ways, Wired.com, July 13, 2011, 
available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/07/seattle-comcast/ (last visited May 30, 2012). After Vrignaud’s 
story received national attention, Comcast offered to restore his service, though he apparently declined the offer. 
Dean Takahashi, Who Will Pick Up Paying Customer That Comcast Dropped Because of High Data Usage? July 
29, 2011, available at http://venturebeat.com/2011/07/29/who-will-pick-up-paying-customer-that-comcast-dropped-
because-of-high-data-usage/ (last visited August 26, 2012). 
22 In Beaumont, Texas, customers were offered a choice of 5, 10, 20, or 40 gigabytes monthly, with a fee for 
exceeding the cap. See Chloe Albanesius, Time Warner to Test Usage-Based System, PC Magazine, January 17, 
2008, available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2250259,00.asp (last visited May 30, 2012). The company 
later marketed 100-gigabyte caps in New York and North Carolina. Chloe Albanesius, Time Warner Scraps 
Bandwidth Cap Testing, PC Magazine, April 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2345430,00.asp (last visited May 28, 2012). 
23 See Jared Newman, AT&T’s U-Verse and DSL Data Caps: Good Deal, Bad Precedent, PCWorld, March 14, 
2011, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/222039/atandts_uverse_and_dsl_data_caps_good_deal_bad_precedent.html (last 
visited May 30, 2012); CenturyLink Excessive Use Policy, available at 
http://qwest.centurylink.com/internethelp/eup.html (last visited May 28, 2012). 
24 See Comcast Monthly Data Usage Threshold Suspension, May 17, 2012, available at 
http://customer.comcast.com/help-and-support/internet/common-questions-excessive-use/ (last visited May 30, 
2012). 
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consumption in 2011 was 22.7 gigabytes.25 Based on this figure, one could use thirteen times the 
mean amount of data consumption before running afoul of Comcast’s 300-gigabyte limit. 
According to Netflix, streaming video typically consumes between 0.3 and 1.0 gigabytes per 
hour, while its high-definition (HD) content streams at 2.3 gigabytes per hour.26 To reach 300 
gigabytes, one would need to stream 130 hours of HD content in one month—or approximately 
two feature-length movies each day. Alternatively, one could stream between 300 and 1000 
hours of non-HD content. Comcast notes that its previous 250-gigabyte data cap permitted a 
customer to send approximately 50 million emails or download 62,500 songs each month.27 
While it is not inconceivable that a customer would reach these monthly figures, they statistically 
exceed the amount of content a typical subscriber consumes during a one-month period. To help 
consumers track their monthly usage and determine how much data individual activities 
consume, Comcast has created an online Data Usage Meter.28 
C. Usage-Based Pricing for Wireless Broadband Service 
Like fixed broadband service, wireless broadband started as a flat-rate unlimited data 
plan. But the surprisingly strong surge in mobile data demand driven by the smartphone 
revolution prompted most wireless carriers to shift to data caps, primarily as a way to slow the 
growth rate of mobile broadband demand until network capacity can catch up.29 In 2007, AT&T 
paid generously to be the exclusive carrier of Apple’s iPhone, at a time when the smartphone 
                                                 
25 Sandvine, supra note 3, at 5. While mean monthly data use is 22.7 gigabytes, median monthly data use is a much 
lower 5.8 gigabytes. This implies that the mean is artificially inflated by heavier users and the median figure is more 
representative of the “average” household. Nonetheless, to be cautious, this analysis uses the mean figure, 
particularly in light of the fact that per capita data consumption has likely increased since 2011. 
26 Neil Hunt, Netflix Lowers Data Usage By 2/3 For Members In Canada, Netflix US & Canada Blog, March 28, 
2011, available at http://blog.netflix.com/2011/03/netflix-lowers-data-usage-by-23-for.html.  
27 See supra note 18. 
28 Comcast, Comcast.net Terms Of Service - Data Usage Meter, available at 
http://networkmanagement.comcast.net/datausagemeter.htm.  
29 See, e.g., Andrew M. Seybold, Wireless Network Congestion, February 2012, available at 
http://andrewseybold.com/2845-wireless-network-congestion (last visited August 23, 2012). 
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was in its infancy. While the agreement succeeded in drawing more smartphone customers to 
AT&T, these customers were generally tech-savvy users with significant data demands.30 By 
some reports, the average iPhone user consumed ten times the bandwidth of a typical smartphone 
user.31 This concentration of heavy data users on the AT&T network led to much-publicized 
congestion and a marked service decline in many urban areas, where smartphone users were 
concentrated. The company explained that 40 percent of the network’s traffic was driven by just 
3 percent of its smartphone users, forcing the company to examine strategies for either reducing 
their usage or seeking additional contributions to offset the congestion that they caused.32 In 
December 2010, AT&T shifted to a three-tiered pricing plan, with limits at 200 megabytes, 2 
gigabytes, and 4 gigabytes, with a per-gigabyte overage charge.33 Verizon Wireless adopted 
similar caps the following year,34 and in mid-2012 both companies added a shared-data option, 
which allows customers to share their monthly data among as many as ten devices.  
Other wireless carriers have embraced different methods of managing consumer data use. 
Like its competitors, T-Mobile also adopted a tiered pricing system for its customers in 2011. T-
Mobile, however, does not assess an overage charge on customers who exceed the cap. Instead, 
those customers see their speed slowed to 100 kilobytes per second for the rest of the month. 
Sprint is currently the only major carrier to offer unlimited data at a flat rate. But speed tests 
                                                 
30 Brian X. Chen, AT&T Chief Regrets Offering Unlimited Data for iPhone, New York Times Blog, May 4, 2012, 
available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/att-randall-stephenson/ (last visited May 28, 2012). 
31 Sam Oliver, AT&T Caps New iPhone, iPad Data Plans at 2GB, Announces Tethering, June 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/10/06/02/att_announces_iphone_tethering_plans_caps_ipad_3g_data_at_2gb.h
tml (last visited May 28, 2012). 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Trefis Team, Verizon’s Stock Looks Full at $42 as It Readies to Scrap Unlimited Data Plans, Forbes, May 29, 
2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/05/29/verizons-stock-looks-full-at-42-as-it-
readies-to-scrap-unlimited-data-plans/ (last visited May 28, 2012). Verizon’s data caps came shortly after Apple 
made the iPhone available on Verizon’s network. Both AT&T and Verizon initially grandfathered in the unlimited 
flat-rate data plans for existing customers, although both sometimes throttle back the speeds of the top five percent 
of data users still enrolled in these unlimited plans. Verizon Wireless has further announced that these grandfathered 
customers must surrender their unlimited data plans if they wish to migrate from 3G to the company’s new LTE 
network, meaning many unlimited plans will be phased out over the next few years. Id. 
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often place the Sprint network a distant third behind AT&T and Verizon in most major areas, 
which suggests these unlimited plans may take a toll on network operations.35 
II. Usage-Based Pricing as a Cost Recovery Tool 
At their core, data caps and other forms of usage-based pricing represent different pricing 
strategies through which a company can spread its costs over its customer base. Usage-based 
pricing allows broadband companies to shift more of their network costs onto those who use the 
network the most. This alternative pricing strategy may prove both more efficient for network 
providers and more attractive to consumers, particularly those who are priced out of the flat-rate 
system.  
A. Distributional Effects of Flat-Rate and Metered Pricing 
Under a flat-rate pricing system, lighter users end up paying a disproportionate share of 
overall network costs. As the Federal Communications Commission has noted, “Requiring all 
subscribers to pay the same amount for broadband service, regardless of the performance or 
usage of the service, would force lighter end users of the network to subsidize heavier end 
users.”36 Heavier users consume more of the network’s total capacity than lighter users. Yet light 
and heavy users contribute equally to cover the network’s costs. This means that lighter users 
pay a higher effective rate per megabyte than heavier users, since they pay the same fee yet 
consume less service.  
                                                 
35 See, e.g., David Goldman, Which iPhone Carrier Is Best in Your City?, May 30, 2012, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/30/technology/iphone-carrier-compare/ (last visited May 30, 2012). PC Magazine 
notes that nationwide tests show Sprint’s 3G network is “the slowest of the major wireless providers,” with 
download speeds half of that on Verizon’s 3G network. The company is developing a 4G LTE network that will 
make the company more competitive. The new network is projected to deliver maximum speeds slower than AT&T 
or Verizon, but is designed to manage traffic so as to deliver a consistent average speed during periods of high 
demand. Sascha Segan and Alex Colon, Exclusive: Testing Sprint’s New 4G LTE Network, June 18, 2012, available 
at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2405675,00.asp (last visited August 26, 2012).  
36 Id.; see In re Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17945 ¶ 72 (2010). 
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To put the Commission’s concern another way, flat-rate pricing forces below-average 
users to purchase more broadband access than they use.37 Typically, the network owner will set a 
price that reflects the bandwidth consumed by the average user.38 This means that lighter users 
are charged as if they consume an average amount of bandwidth monthly, although by definition 
their actual usage is below the average amount.  
This disparity could discourage broadband adoption and limit access to the services that 
broadband makes available, particularly among poorer consumers. If lighter users are forced to 
purchase more broadband than they need, some lighter users may choose not to purchase access 
at the single flat rate, even though the benefits they receive would exceed the cost of providing 
service at their anticipated volume level.39 These consumers demand less of the Internet each 
month than the average user and therefore may not place a high premium on unlimited access, 
though they could pay a lower rate for enough monthly bandwidth to meet their needs.  
These effects would be unremarkable if most consumers used roughly the same amount 
of data. Cross-subsidization is of little importance if there is little absolute difference in data 
consumption between below-average and above-average users. In that instance, the amount of 
the subsidy would be small and might cancel out over time if individual users consume slightly 
below-average amounts of data in one month, and slightly above-average amounts in the next.  
But this turns out not to be the case. According to Sandvine’s Fall 2011 report on 
network traffic, the heaviest 1 percent of downstream users account for 15.2 percent of total 
North American fixed downstream traffic, while the heaviest 1 percent of upstream users account 
                                                 
37 Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 179, 203. 
38 See id. 
39 Id. 
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for almost 43 percent of total upstream use.40 By comparison, the lightest 60 percent of 
consumers account for only 10 percent of total North American fixed broadband traffic.41  
The gulf is vaster in the wireless market. Sandvine notes that median monthly mobile 
data consumption in North America is 3.1 megabytes. But mean monthly consumption is over 
one hundred times that figure, at 347 megabytes.42 This surprising result stems from the fact that 
the mobile data market is bimodal, consisting of a large number of first-generation feature 
phones in addition to a customer base of more data-intensive smartphones and tablets. Therefore 
the mobile data network is dominated by a smaller number of heavy users. In fact, Sandvine 
estimates that the heaviest 1 percent of mobile data users consume 26.8 percent of upstream and 
21.3 percent of downstream mobile traffic. By comparison, the bottom 80 percent of users 
account for only 10 percent of total traffic combined.43 
Given the substantial disparity between heavy and light users, it is not surprising that 
some broadband providers are exploring alternative pricing regimes that would eliminate the 
cross-subsidy. Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski noted that usage-based pricing can 
“increase choice and competition, and it can increase fairness. It can . . . result in lower prices for 
people who consume less broadband, so experimentation in this area with those goals in mind is 
particularly appropriate.”44 Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowitz similarly 
supports usage-based pricing, noting that the practice would help fund future investment in 
network expansion and upgrades.45 
 
                                                 
40 Sandvine, supra note 3,at 5. “Downstream” refers to the flow of information from the Internet to the consumer, 
while “upstream” refers to the flow of information from the consumer to another destination on the Internet. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 Usage-Based Pricing Can Help Competition, Genachowski Says, Communications Daily, May 23, 2012.  
45 Jonathan Make, Usage Based Billing Seen Being Introduced by U.S. Wireline ISPs, Communications Daily, June 
21, 2011. [Does this citation need a page/section number or URL?] 
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1. Simple Metered Pricing 
There are several usage-based pricing models that could shift more network costs onto 
heavier users. A simple metered pricing plan, which bills the consumer on a per-megabyte or 
per-gigabyte basis, would ensure that the amount each consumer pays for broadband access 
reflects the use the consumer receives from the network. Like water utilities, broadband 
providers could set a higher per-unit rate on data consumption above a certain amount to recover 
an even greater proportion of costs from those who draw most upon the common bandwidth 
pool.  
But simple metered pricing might prove difficult to administer. First, the additional 
transaction costs of real-time tracking and billing at the customer-specific level may offset any 
revenue gains achieved by price discrimination. Christopher Yoo posits that high transaction 
costs might be the reason why the local telephone market never moved to per-minute pricing 
despite a strong case that such pricing would be more efficient and fairer to consumers. He 
suggests that similar dynamics could also undermine usage-based broadband pricing.46 Brett 
Frischmann and Barbara von Schewick have responded that in the broadband market, these 
transaction costs are probably much lower than Yoo hypothesizes, given that most consumers 
access the Internet through a single network gateway.47 They also note that many providers 
already offer an array of statistics on individual use by consumer.48 This is particularly true in 
the wireless industry, where both provider-operated and third-party applications give users real-
time information about data use and send warnings as data use approaches important 
                                                 
46 Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1868 (2006). 
47 Brett M. Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information 
Superhighway: A Response to Professor Yoo, 47 JURISMETRICS 383, 394 (2007). 
48 Id. 
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thresholds.49 But even with these gains in tracking, providers may find it difficult to set purely 
volume-based prices in a way that will reasonably assure investors that significant fixed 
installment costs will be met. 
Simple metered pricing also might prove a challenge for consumers. Although many 
consumers could pay less under a metered system, Andrew Odlyzko stresses the importance of 
“mental transaction costs,” the cost to consumers of the mental effort required to sort out the 
many available choices in an increasingly complicated world.50 After facing choices all day, 
consumers may simply find it fatiguing to have to decide whether downloading a movie in HD 
rather than standard definition is worth the additional bandwidth cost.51 Odlyzko also notes that 
unlimited use has an insurance effect: some customers may prefer to pay more for unlimited 
service in order to be protected from bill shock during a period of unusually high broadband 
usage (if, for example, a child unwittingly downloads significant quantities of data).52 Odlyzko 
argues that the decision fatigue and insurance effects likely contributed to the results of AT&T 
studies in the 1970s showing that even light-use consumers preferred flat-rate billing to per-
minute billing of local service, though they presumably pay less under a metered regime.53 
Similarly, in the late 1990s AT&T Worldnet dial-up customers typically moved from metered 
rates to a $19.95 flat rate for unlimited use when their metered rates approached $11-12/month.54 
                                                 
49 Verizon and AT&T each offer applications, known as My Verizon and myAT&T, respectively, that report a 
customer’s data use as measured by the company’s remote servers. Several third-party applications, such as 3G 
Watchdog, report usage by tracking information as it flows through the device itself. See, e.g., Ed Rhee, How to 
Track Data Usage on Your Android Phone, http://howto.cnet.com/8301-11310_39-20077775-285/how-to-track-
data-usage-on-your-android-phone/ (last visited August 24, 2012). 
50 See Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 41-42; Andrew Odlyzko, The History of Communications and Its 
Implications for the Internet at 7, 72 (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=235284. Odlyzko credits Nick 
Szabo with originating the phrase, to describe the difficulty of implementing micropayment regimes. 
51 Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 44. 
52 Id. at 41. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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These studies suggest that many consumers are willing to pay a premium to avoid having to 
make a cost-benefit analysis of each broadband transaction. 
2. Data Caps  
Data caps and tiered service also help broadband companies shift more network costs 
onto heavier users. All customers pay the same flat rate for service up to the cap, and heavier 
users pay an additional amount per unit for consumption beyond the cap. Like metered pricing, 
data caps help solve some of the inefficiencies of flat-rate service. The overage charge becomes a 
way to mitigate the cross-subsidy by recovering a greater portion of network costs from heavier 
users. Tiered service plans increase customer choice by offering them several different caps from 
which to choose. 
Data caps help ameliorate some of the stress that simple metering places on consumers. A 
soft data cap set well above the average monthly use provides most users the same predictability 
of the flat-rate model and spares most subscribers the mental accounting costs of a strictly 
metered regime. Most consumers will receive peace of mind knowing that unless they 
dramatically increase their online activity, they will remain under the cap and can predict with 
certainty their monthly broadband costs. Therefore the high data caps that mark many fixed 
wireless plans provide most users with an insurance effect similar to flat-rate use and avoid the 
decision fatigue caused by performing a cost-benefit analysis of every online interaction. But the 
lower data caps that mark wireless plans force even typical users to think more carefully about 
their wireless broadband consumption. For example, they lead wireless consumers to use wifi 
where possible to offload traffic from 3G and 4G networks to less congested fixed broadband 
networks, which is generally an efficient practice. Of course, even under high fixed data caps, 
heavier users must monitor their usage and evaluate the cost of activities that might push them 
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over the cap. But the network’s heaviest users are likely to be the most technologically savvy and 
most likely to understand their data consumption patterns. They are therefore less likely than the 
average user to suffer significant mental fatigue from calculating the megabyte consumption of 
an online activity or determining whether the activity is worth the price.  
B. Recovering Costs through Price Discrimination 
1. Marginal and Fixed Broadband Costs 
Some commentators have questioned the notion that usage-based pricing helps networks 
recover their costs more efficiently. They argue that it is a mistake to load more network costs 
onto heavier users because of the low marginal cost of data consumption. Odlyzko notes that 
statistical multiplexing allows multiple users to share the same bandwidth simultaneously, 
meaning that each additional user imposes only trivial marginal costs onto the network. Although 
as Odlyzko notes, “determining the actual cost of using a broadband network is exceedingly 
difficult,”55 a New York Times editorial states that “moving an extra gigabyte of data at off-peak 
times costs virtually nothing.”56 Similarly, Netflix, which is responsible for almost a third of all 
peak-time downstream traffic and therefore sees data caps as a threat to business growth, claims 
that “the marginal cost of providing an extra gigabyte of data . . . is less than one cent, and 
falling.” As a result, Netflix general counsel David Hyman asserts that there is “no good reason 
for bandwidth caps and fees to take root.” 57 For this reason, skeptics claim it is “entirely 
inaccurate” to suggest that average users subsidize heavier “bandwidth hogs.”58 Free Press, 
Public Knowledge, and other public interest groups have thus asked regulators and antitrust 
                                                 
55 Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 19. 
56 To Cap, or Not: Broadband Limits Need to be Carefully Monitored to Promote Innovation and Competition, New 
York Times, July 21, 2011, at A20. 
57 David Hyman, Why Bandwidth Pricing Is Anti-Competitive, Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2011. 
58 Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 17. 
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enforcers to investigate the industry’s use of data caps because the caps lack any “legitimate 
economic justification.”59 
As an initial matter, the call for additional oversight on these grounds seemingly reflects 
a misunderstanding of the role of regulation. Underlying this critique is the unstated premise that 
equitable cost distribution is the only presumptively “legitimate” broadband pricing strategy, and 
companies must justify to the regulator any deviation from this model. While an equality 
standard has an intuitive appeal,60 there is no reason to believe that it represents the only, or even 
the best, broadband pricing structure. Generally, when companies experiment with different 
pricing strategies, they can test potentially more efficient business models.61 If these new models 
prove less efficient, companies will abandon them. This experimentation brings consumers the 
benefits of increased competition and increased choices in the marketplace. Normally, the 
regulator should intervene only if the practice actually harms consumers, and consumers cannot 
punish the practice because the company has market power. Otherwise, companies should be 
presumptively permitted to experiment with alternative forms of cost recovery, as 
experimentation helps the industry test potentially more efficient methods of operation. 
But setting aside this general objection, focusing on only the marginal cost of each 
gigabyte of capacity tells us little about efficient broadband pricing.62 It is true that, except 
during periods of congestion, the marginal costs of additional bandwidth consumption are very 
small. But emphasizing marginal costs ignores the significant sunk costs required to build and 
                                                 
59 Letter from Free Press et al., supra note 10, at 2; see also Public Knowledge, Petition to Enforce Merger 
Conditions, supra note 11. 
60 See, e.g., Matthew Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case against Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 583-85 (2006). Edwards notes an Annenberg Public Policy Center report that 
concludes consumers “overwhelmingly object” to differential pricing as “ethically wrong.” See id. at 585, citing 
Joseph Turow et al., Open to Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline, at 4 (2005). 
61 Edwards, supra note 60, at 586-91. 
62 Scott Wallsten, Data Caps Aren’t Perfect, but That’s OK, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/05/opinion-
data-caps-arent-perfect-but-thats-okay/,  
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maintain a broadband network. As Gregory Sidak explains, investors will fund these networks 
only if they can reasonably expect that the company will recover the costs of this investment, 
including a competitive return on capital.63 Marginal cost pricing is thus insufficient because it 
does not provide sufficient revenue to cover the network’s fixed costs.64  
In the broadband industry, those costs are significant. Broadband providers have invested 
over $300 billion in private capital in the past decade to build and upgrade the nation’s 
broadband networks.65 These investments include nearly $23 billion that Verizon has invested to 
replace legacy copper telephone wire with higher-speed fiber optic cable in portions of its 
footprint, to boost broadband speeds and capacity in those neighborhoods.66 AT&T has also 
spent billions in fiber upgrades.67 In the wireless sector, providers spent nearly $20 billion in 
2008 to acquire spectrum when the 700 MHz block was freed up by the digital television 
transition, and are investing billions more to develop those assets into high-speed LTE data 
networks.68 Of course, some broadband companies can recover these costs partly through voice 
                                                 
63 J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMP. L. 
& ECON. 349, 357 (2006). 
64 Id.; see also Wallsten, supra note 62. 
65 Craig Moffett, U.S. Telecommunications and Cable & Satellite: Capital Punishment, Bernstein Research, 
December 2010, at 6; see also Randolph J. May, Prices and Profits in the Broadband Marketplace, August 11, 2011, 
available at http://freestatefoundation.blogspot.com/2011/08/prices-and-profits-in-broadband.html (last visited May 
28, 2012). The Columbia Institute for Tele-Information estimates that broadband providers invested $69 billion in 
2008 and $60 billion in 2009 alone, of which approximately half was attributable to broadband service (as opposed 
to other services that the companies provide). See Larry F. Darby and Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Innovation and National 
Broadband Policies: Facts, Fiction, and Unanswered Questions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 20 MEDIA L. & POL. 
3, 11-12 (Fall 2011).  
66 Moffett, supra note 65, at 28. 
67 As Moffett notes, Verizon’s FiOS service provides fiber-optic cable to the consumer’s home. By comparison, 
AT&T’s U-Verse project provides fiber-optic cable to a neighborhood node, but relies upon legacy copper wire to 
transmit data from the node to individual homes. By avoiding the last-mile fiber drop, AT&T has spent much less 
per subscriber than Verizon. But Verizon’s network will deliver greater speeds and capacity as Internet demand 
continues to grow. As Moffett writes, “Verizon’s network is inarguably future-proof. AT&T’s is not.” Id. 
68 Eric Bangeman, 700 MHz Auction Wraps Up, Tops $19.5 Billion, Ars Technica, March 18, 2008, available at 
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/03/700mhz-spectrum-auction-wraps-up-tops-19-5-billion/ (last visited 
May 30, 2012). 
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and cable services that network upgrades also make available.69 But a recent Federal 
Communications Commission report suggests that “as much as two-thirds of current investments 
are being made to provide and expand wired and wireless broadband” rather than voice or cable 
service, and “the trend over the past few years has been growing.”70 Moreover, as subscribership 
rates fall, it seems likely that telecommunications companies must look increasingly to 
broadband rates to recover these common costs.71 Investment analyst Craig Moffett estimates 
that the return on these investments has been flat to negative over the past decade.72 Moffett 
further warns that “companies whose ROICs [Return on Investment Capital] fail to exceed their 
costs of capital or whose marginal ROICs are weak are likely to face stiff headwinds in the 
capital markets” and will be unattractive to investors going forward.73 
These fixed costs are not merely one-time investments. Rather, “sunk investment is made 
continuously over time” as firms continue to expand and upgrade their networks to meet rising 
demand.74 Cisco Systems anticipates that American Internet traffic will almost triple between 
                                                 
69 See Odlyzko, supra note 10, at 20-21. To the extent that these costs are directly attributable to other services alone 
(such as the cost of new set-top boxes for cable customers), they should be excluded from the broadband cost base. 
But much of these firms’ network investment consists of common costs: upgrades to the network that benefit both 
broadband and other services. There are many ways that these common costs can be allocated among the company’s 
services. As discussed below, Ramsey pricing suggests that a multiproduct firm should recover its common costs by 
raising prices on both products in a way that preserves the ratio of consumption that would occur if the rates were 
priced at marginal cost. This means raising prices more on price-inelastic services than on price-elastic ones. See, 
e.g., William Baumol and David Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 
265, 265-83 (1970); Frank Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J., 47, 47-61 (1927). 
Elasticity estimates vary widely among studies, but it is quite possible that broadband service is more inelastic than 
cable or telephone service, given the wider range of services that broadband makes available. If this is true, then 
Ramsey pricing suggests much of these common costs should be recovered through broadband prices rather than 
cable or telephone rates.  
70 Robert C. Atkinson and Ivy E. Schultz, Broadband in America: Where It Is and Where It Is Going (According to 
Broadband Providers), Report Prepared for FCC’s Omnibus Broadband Initiative, at 11 (2009). 
71 See, e.g., Moffett, supra note 65, at 11. (“Carriers have no choice but to invest in the network to keep it 
operational, and are allocating ‘growth capital’ to it by building-out expensive fiber infrastructures. At the same 
time, highly profitable traditional voice subscribers are fleeing in droves, leaving the network to support fewer 
operating profit dollars.”) 
72 Moffett, supra note 65, at 1. 
73 Id. at 12. 
74 Sidak, supra note 63, at 357. 
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2011 and 2016, representing a 21 percent compound annual growth rate.75 Mobile data will grow 
at an even faster rate: Cisco estimates that mobile traffic will grow sixteen-fold by 2016, or 74 
percent each year between now and then.76 This increase is driven by consumer demand for 
greater quantities of and more bandwidth-intensive Internet content and applications, such as 
streaming video and real-time teleconferencing.77 According to Sandvine, real-time 
entertainment comprised 54 percent of peak-time traffic on fixed networks, up from 29 percent 
in 2009, and 31 percent of peak mobile traffic, up from 11 percent only two years ago.78 As a 
result, analysts estimate that broadband providers must continue to invest $30 billion to $40 
billion annually to expand and upgrade their networks to meet this growing demand.79 
2. The Potential Value of Price Discrimination 
Thus for broadband providers and other industries with significant fixed costs, the 
challenge is to design a pricing structure that spreads fixed costs intelligently across the 
company’s customer base. There are many possible ways that a company may do so, but there is 
no economic reason to believe that, because incremental marginal costs are small, fixed costs 
should be shared equally across all consumers. In fact, writes economist Scott Wallsten, 
“efficient pricing will, in general, charge users with high demand more than users with low 
demand even if those users impose no additional costs on the network.”80 This practice is known 
as price discrimination. 
                                                 
75 Cisco VNI Forecast Highlights, available at 
http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/sp/vni/vni_forecast_highlights/index.html (last visited 30 May 2012). 
76 Id. 
77 Sandvine, supra note 3, at 6. 
78 Id. at 6, 10. 
79 See, e.g., May, supra note 65; Atkinson and Schultz, supra note 70, at 11. 
80 Wallsten, supra note 62. 
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Price discrimination occurs when a company sells similar goods to different buyers based 
on their willingness to pay, rather than the cost of service.81 Or in economic terms, it is when a 
company’s sales exhibit different ratios of price to cost.82 Price discrimination stems from the 
recognition that different customers have different reservation prices, the maximum rate that a 
customer is willing to pay for a good or service. Its success depends first upon the firm’s ability 
to identify and charge more to those customers who have higher reservation prices, and second 
on customers’ inability to arbitrage the price difference. 
Although “price discrimination gets a bad name in part because it sounds so sinister,”83 it 
is a fairly common practice throughout society (although sometimes it goes by the more benign 
term “customer segmentation”). Matthew Edwards notes that many movie theaters provide 
discounts to senior citizens and children, thus charging adult non-senior customers more for the 
same good.84 Publishers offer titles at different rates to consumers and institutional buyers, such 
as colleges and libraries.85 And a car dealership may sell the same model automobile to different 
customers at different prices, if one customer is better at haggling and a discount is needed to 
close the sale.86 Although each of these sellers is engaged in “discrimination,” these price 
differences are a legal and largely uncontroversial practice.87 Price discrimination can be 
                                                 
81 Edwards, supra note 60, at 562. 
82 Id.; see also Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern 
Economies: Time for Reconciliation? 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1239–40 (2010). 
83 See Robert D. Atkinson and Philip J. Weiser, A “Third Way” on Net Neutrality, Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation, May 30, 2006, at 6 . 
84 Edwards, supra note 60, at 563. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 582; see, e.g., Langford v. Rite Aid of Alabama, Inc., 231 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no duty to 
disclose prices or avoid price discrimination between insured and uninsured purchasers of pharmaceuticals); Bonilla 
v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 71 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing that “there is nothing in the law of fraud that prevents 
even a single seller from charging different markups in different markets so long as there is no affirmative 
misrepresentation”). As Professor Edwards notes, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination in certain 
commercial transactions of commodities, if the two buyers are competitors and the sale harms competition between 
them. Edwards, supra note 60, at 577-78. But this act does not protect end-user consumers (who are not 
competitors), for good reason. Id. at 582-83. 
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lucrative for producers, because it allows them to increase revenue by charging higher prices to 
those who place a higher value on the product.  
The practice has more ambiguous effects on customers and total welfare, though antitrust 
scholar Herbert Hovenkamp notes that “most price discrimination is socially beneficial.”88 
Hovenkamp explains that the practice often “produces higher output and thus yields greater 
consumer benefits than forced nondiscriminatory pricing.”89 One oft-cited example is the airline 
industry, which exhibits a cost structure similar to broadband providers and where price 
discrimination occurs regularly.90 Assume, for example, that an airline’s average cost to 
transport a passenger on a full flight is $700. This amount would be sufficient to cover the 
passenger’s small marginal costs (primarily the in-flight meal) and a pro rata portion of the 
flight’s fixed costs (such as fuel, employee salaries, and the installment payment for the plane). 
The business traveler, racing to town for a meeting, may pay $1000 for her ticket, while the 
college student who is heading home may pay only $500 for the next seat over.91 The 
businessperson likely has a higher reservation price than the college student, because of the 
greater demands on her time. By charging the businessperson a higher price, the airline can 
secure from her a greater contribution to the airline’s fixed costs. This contribution allows the 
airline to offer a discounted ticket to the student.  
In this hypothetical, the ability to price discriminate allows the airline to serve more 
customers than under a flat-rate system. If the airline were instead forced to charge a single 
uniform rate of $700, the student and others with lower reservation prices would not be able to 
                                                 
88 Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW, P 2340c, at 139, quoted in Edwards, supra note 60, at 588. 
89 Id.; see also Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation vs. Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1678 (2011). (“Although ‘discrimination’ has a negative popular association, in economic 
theory, price discrimination may actually serve to increase consumer welfare.”) 
90 Wallsten, supra note 62; Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Net Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 282 
(2008). 
91 Wallsten, supra note 62. 
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fly. Moreover, the airline might not be able to sell enough $700 tickets to fill the airplane, which 
would mean the uniform rate would have to be greater than $700 to cover the flight’s fixed 
costs.92 Of course, the airline could sell more tickets at a $500 rate, but this rate would fail to 
cover the airline’s fixed costs. If airlines were forbidden from engaging in price discrimination, 
many customers who currently receive discounted fares would have to pay more for airline 
tickets, and many would instead choose not to fly at all.93 Price discrimination allows the airline 
to capture more revenue from those willing to pay more, while expanding service to customers 
with lower reservation prices. 
Of course, price discrimination works only if the company can successfully separate 
customers by reservation price. Ideally, a company would like to charge each customer exactly 
the maximum that the customer is willing to pay for the good—a scenario known as “first-degree 
price discrimination.”94 In reality, first-degree price discrimination is virtually impossible to 
achieve, so companies must devise strategies to segment the customer base. One way airlines 
distinguish business executives from students is by offering separate first-class and coach tickets. 
First-class fares include additional perks designed to appeal to executives, perks for which they 
are willing to pay extra but which do not add measurably to the marginal cost of service. Another 
way is to put restrictions on discount tickets that would discourage executives from buying. For 
example, requiring a twenty-one-day advance purchase to receive the discounted rate drives 
executives toward a higher fare, since business trips are often scheduled at the last minute and 
cannot be predicted three weeks in advance.95 Similarly, offering the discount only in 
                                                 
92 In this hypothetical, one can assume that the airline cannot sell all its seats at a $700 rate. Otherwise, it would not 
have sold a $500 ticket to the student. 
93 Weiser, supra note 90, at 283. 
94 Edwards, supra note 60, at 566. 
95 Id. 
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conjunction with a Saturday stay is an inconvenience for business executives who would rather 
spend their weekends at home with their families.96  
3. Ramsey Pricing and Price Discrimination in the Broadband Industry 
In the broadband industry, as with many industries marked by high fixed costs, price 
discrimination based on customers’ willingness to pay is an efficient way to recover costs with 
minimal distortion to overall social welfare.97 This practice, familiar to many regulated 
industries, is known as Ramsey pricing. Ideally, a firm maximizes overall social welfare by 
pricing its goods at marginal cost: this ensures that the company serves every customer who 
values the good more than the cost of producing it.98 But as noted above, broadband providers 
cannot use marginal cost pricing because they need to recover fixed costs and make future 
network investments.99 With Ramsey pricing, firms recover these fixed costs by raising prices 
more on those who are most willing to pay for the service, and less on those who would buy less 
(or not at all) if the price rose.100 Or in economic terms, the firm should set prices in inverse 
proportion to customers’ price elasticity of demand.101 In an ideal world, where the firm can 
perfectly separate each customer by his or her elasticity, Ramsey pricing would allow the firm to 
recover all of its costs while ensuring that few if any consumers who value the service at 
marginal cost will ever be priced out of the market.102  
                                                 
96 Of course, firms can price discriminate for reasons other than finding customer reservation prices. For example, 
many airlines offer bereavement fares for families traveling to funerals, despite the fact that a funeral is an important 
event and the customer may have a high reservation price to get to the event on time. This form of humane price 
discrimination would also be impossible if airlines were required to charge a uniform flat rate per seat.  
97 Sidak, supra note 63, at 368. 
98 Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination without Market Power, 19 YALE J. REG. 1, 9 (2002). 
99 See text accompanying notes 62-80. 
100 Levine, supra note 98, at 9. 
101 See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone 
Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 85 & n.205 (2008); see generally Baumol and Bradford, supra note 69, and 
Ramsey, supra note 69. 
102 Levine, supra note 98, at 9. 
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Usage-based pricing strategies can approximate Ramsey efficiency. By paying for 
consumption, consumers reveal how much they value broadband access. This form of price 
discrimination allows providers to put more network costs onto those whose consumption is least 
sensitive to changes in price. The extent to which the pricing strategy approximates Ramsey 
efficiency depends on the ability of the pricing structure to separate customers by willingness to 
pay. Simple metered pricing segments customers substantially, correlating prices charged with 
the value each consumer receives from network usage. If heavy users are highly price inelastic, a 
higher per-unit charge for consumption above a certain threshold may get even closer to Ramsey 
efficiency. By comparison, data caps divide the customer base into only two groups (typical 
users, who do not exceed the cap, and heavy users, who do), but allow further segmentation of 
the heavy user group through the overage charge. Tiered pricing lies somewhere between these 
two poles. By allowing customers to choose from an array of possible caps, the provider can 
segment its customer base more finely than with a simple cap. The provider can experiment with 
different tiers and different rates per tier until it finds the pricing structure that best covers its 
fixed costs. 
Some courts have viewed price discrimination skeptically, assuming that the practice 
indicates that the firm has market power.103 But as a unanimous Supreme Court recently 
recognized, “while price discrimination may provide evidence of market power . . . it is generally 
recognized that it also occurs in fully competitive markets.”104 The Court’s holding is consistent 
with more recent scholarship suggesting that price discrimination is often a byproduct of healthy 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., Gloria J. Hurdle and Henry B. McFarland, Criteria for Identifying Market Power: A Comment on 
Baumol and Swanson, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 688 (2003); Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: 
The Exercise of Market Power without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment on Klein and Wiley), 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 
643, 644 (2003), (“Price discrimination is properly understood as providing evidence of market power, as antitrust 
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104 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-45 (2006). 
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competition among firms. William Baumol and Daniel Swanson have explained that competition 
compels firms to charge lower prices to price sensitive consumers when possible.105 When 
companies have significant fixed costs, new firms can enter the market, and customers can be 
segmented by demand, companies must resort to price discrimination or else they will fail to 
cover their costs.106 Michael Levine similarly argues that in firms with high fixed costs, price 
discrimination will often be the dominant pricing strategy even in the absence of market 
power.107 Under these conditions, Baumol and Swanson argue, price discrimination may be 
inevitable and “firms may be able to indulge persistently in uniform pricing only if they possess 
the sort of monopoly power that forecloses such competition and enables them to obtain 
abundant earnings.”108  
4. Price Discrimination and Increasing Broadband Penetration Rates 
Usage-based pricing may also make entry-level broadband access more affordable.109 
The Federal Communications Commission has stated that increasing broadband adoption is one 
of its biggest public policy challenges.110 While 65 percent of Americans have broadband access, 
those without access are generally “older, poorer, less educated, more likely to be a racial or 
ethnic minority, and more likely to have a disability” than those with broadband in the home.111 
According to the Commission’s survey, those without broadband access cited cost as the primary 
                                                 
105 William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price 
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barrier to adoption.112 A 2009 report by Kevin Hassett and Robert Shapiro similarly concludes 
based upon several studies that “price is the strongest determinant of broadband subscription.”113 
After projecting broadband adoption rates under different pricing models, Hassett and Shapiro 
conclude that “spreading [broadband] costs equally among all consumers—the minority who use 
large amounts of bandwidth and the majority who use very little—will significantly slow the rate 
of adoption at the lower end of the income scale.”114 If broadband providers can shift more 
network costs onto heavier users, they can offer lower rates for light users. This practice benefits 
firms and consumers alike: it allows firms to capture more of the demand curve, offering service 
to more people who value the service above marginal cost, while at the same time it narrows the 
“digital divide” between those who can afford broadband access and those who cannot.115 
Of course, price discrimination only leads to higher adoption rates if broadband providers 
in fact lower prices for lighter users. This appears to be the case. A 2010 study by Scott Wallsten 
and James Riso surveyed nearly 25,000 broadband plans across several OECD countries.116 They 
found that residential broadband plans with data caps were, on average, about $164 less per year 
than similar but unlimited plans, while residential triple play plans (which combine broadband, 
voice, and video) were $152 less per year if they contain a data cap.117 As a result, Wallsten and 
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http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/austan.goolsbee/research/broadb.pdf; and John Horrigan, Home Broadband 
Adoption 2009, Pew Internet & American Life Project (2009), available at 
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Riso conclude that “many consumers, particularly the low-volume users, are likely to pay less for 
broadband with data caps than they would for plans offering unlimited data transfer.”118 
One also sees some evidence of this effect in the wireless broadband industry, though the 
record is mixed. In June 2010, AT&T eliminated its $30/month unlimited data plan for 
smartphone users. Instead, customers could choose a 200-megabyte plan for $15 per month, or 2 
gigabytes for $25 per month.119 If a customer exceeded his or her data cap, the company charged 
$15 for each additional 200 megabytes on the smaller plan or $10 for each additional gigabyte 
under the larger plan.120 At the time of the change, 65 percent of AT&T customers used less than 
200 megabytes of data each month, while 98 percent used less than 2 gigabytes.121 This meant 
that the move from unlimited to tiered service was less expensive for most AT&T customers and 
made wireless broadband a more affordable option for consumers who found the $30 flat rate 
unacceptable.122 But there was no comparable savings when Verizon Wireless phased out its 
$30/month unlimited data plan in June 2011, shortly after introducing the iPhone to its network. 
Henceforth, new Verizon customers could choose from three different tiers of service, the 
cheapest of which was 2 gigabytes per month at the same $30 rate as the old unlimited plan.123 
III. Usage-Based Pricing as a Congestion Management Tool 
Usage-based pricing can also be a tool to compel more efficient network operation. If the 
price a customer pays for use reflects the cost that use imposes on the network, the customer is 
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less likely to overuse the network. Usage-based pricing may also incentivize Internet content and 
application providers and broadband providers themselves to adopt more efficient data-
management practices. The extent to which usage-based pricing can help manage network 
congestion depends on the nature of congestion and the feasibility of structuring a pricing 
strategy that would correlate prices with congestion costs. 
A. Broadband Service and the Possibility of Congestion Costs 
As Christopher Yoo and others have noted, unlimited flat-rate pricing plans “tend to 
induce excessive levels of consumption.”124 This is because broadband service constitutes what 
economists call a “club good.”125 A club good is one that exhibits some characteristics of a 
private good and some of a public good. Like a private good, a club good is excludable, meaning 
the owner can prevent consumers who have not paid from accessing the service.126 This 
distinguishes club goods from purely public goods (such as broadcast television) and common 
pool resources (like fish in a public lake). But club goods are also non-rivalrous, meaning that 
they can be shared by more than one person at the same time.127 This distinguishes them from 
typical private goods such as food or clothing. James Buchanan, the Nobel-prize-winning 
economist who devised the term, cited the swimming pool as his primary example.128 Other 
economists have listed the cinema, cable television, and many social organizations.129 Broadband 
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networks also fit the definition: the broadband provider may exclude consumers who have not 
paid for the service, but multiple consumers can use the network simultaneously.130  
Because of these characteristics, club goods are affected by congestion costs, the 
marginal cost of additional network use. As implied by their name, congestion costs are the costs 
that one consumer’s use imposes on other consumers, which can take the form of packet delays 
or packet loss.131 When the network is lightly loaded, congestion costs are “essentially zero.”132 
But when the network is running near full capacity, the congestion costs created by an additional 
user can be substantial.133 
As Yoo has shown, unlimited flat-rate pricing can lead to overconsumption because 
consumers do not directly pay the congestion costs that they impose on the network.134 Ideally, a 
network provider would want to encourage each consumer to use the network as long as the 
benefit he or she gets from network use exceeds the cost of that use. But under a flat-rate system, 
the consumer pays no additional cost for additional use, even when this consumption imposes 
congestion costs on society as a whole.135 For example, a consumer may choose to watch a 
bandwidth-intensive movie or play interactive video games during peak times, even though this 
adversely affects the network’s overall operations. The consumer suffers some congestion cost 
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(because the movie or game may suffer some congestion-related packet delays), but this cost is 
less than the congestion costs that the consumer’s decision imposes on all other network users.136  
A broadband provider can alleviate congestion in two ways: it can add network capacity 
or it can ration access.137 If congestion occurs regularly, the provider should invest capital to 
expand the network and provide more bandwidth to all users. But if congestion occurs only 
infrequently, expansion may be an inefficient solution, because it leads to significant 
expenditures for additional capacity that lies dormant most of the time. In this situation, rationing 
may be a better solution because it encourages consumers and network owners to manage 
existing capacity more efficiently. 
If done correctly, usage-based pricing can alleviate congestion by discouraging 
bandwidth overconsumption. A per-unit pricing strategy forces each consumer to internalize the 
congestion costs that marginal consumption imposes on others. Ideally, the per-unit price would 
fluctuate to reflect the precise congestion cost of additional use at that time, though transaction 
costs may prohibit pricing at that level of precision.138 By bringing a consumer’s private costs 
into line with the overall social costs of additional use, usage-based pricing encourages a 
consumer to consume additional resources only if his or her benefit exceeds the total cost. 
Usage-based pricing thus can temper the activities of “bandwidth hogs” whose heavy 
consumption could impose substantial congestion costs on their neighbors.  
Usage-based pricing also forces Internet content and application providers to be more 
efficient when sending content to consumers. Because consumers pay based upon bandwidth 
consumed, they demand that content and application providers deliver their services using as 
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little bandwidth as possible. These consumer demands can encourage greater use of zipped files 
and other forms of compression, for example, which leads to greater overall efficiency in 
network use. Odlyzko notes that when Canada adopted usage-based pricing in 2011, Netflix 
responded by offering two tiers of service: a high-quality, heavy-bandwidth streaming service, or 
a low-quality alternative that consumes two-thirds less bandwidth.139 
Finally, usage-based pricing can force broadband providers to operate more efficient 
networks. If a broadband company is paid by volume of traffic that passes through its system, it 
will manage traffic where possible to maximize that volume. As volume rises, the increased 
congestion signals to the broadband provider the need for additional capacity. But importantly, 
under usage-based pricing, the increased volume that generates the congestion also helps fund 
the network expansion.  
Odlyzko argues that usage-based pricing may encourage broadband providers to restrict 
capacity, thus creating artificial scarcity that allows the company to raise rates without investing 
in network expansion.140 But this critique seems misplaced. A provider could create artificial 
scarcity only if it has market power, meaning it is insulated from competition. Otherwise, when a 
provider subjects customers to artificially high levels of congestion or exorbitant rates, 
consumers will flee to another provider that is investing in its network to better meet demand.  
But if a firm has market power, it may avoid additional capital investment whether it uses 
flat rates or usage-based rates. A monopolist charging usage-based rates may lower its data cap 
and use overage charges to pad its bottom line. But a monopolist offering flat rates may exploit 
this power by increasing the rate for unlimited service and pocketing, rather than reinvesting, the 
added revenue. The difference is that under usage-based rates, consumers make efficient use of 
                                                 
139 Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 14, citing Netflix Lowers Data Usage By 2/3 for Members in Canada, Netflix 
Blog, March 28, 2011, available at http://blog.netflix.com/2011/03/netflix-lowers-data-usage-by-23-for.html. 
140 Odlyzko et al., supra note 10, at 56. 
33 
 
the limited capacity available. In a capacity-constricted flat rate system, congestion rises until the 
only people using the network are those who can best tolerate lengthy service delays. This is 
what Jeffrey MacKie-Mason and Hal Varian call the “Yogi Berra equilibrium”: the point where 
the network is “so crowded that no one goes there anymore.”141 Thus while firms may have 
incentives to pad profits by restricting capacity, their ability to do so depends much more on their 
market power than their choice of pricing strategy.  
Whether usage-based pricing can be a useful tool to manage broadband congestion turns 
on two subsidiary inquiries. First, how congested are broadband networks? And second, how 
easily can usage-based pricing target and alleviate that congestion?  
B. Measuring Broadband Congestion  
Although congestion is difficult to measure with certainty, and performance varies by 
network provider, many analysts have concluded that congestion is not presently a significant 
problem for fixed broadband networks.142 The Federal Communications Commission’s most 
recent survey of fixed broadband performance, released in July 2012, shows that the average 
fixed broadband provider delivered 96 percent of its advertised speeds during peak usage 
periods.143 This was up from 87 percent in 2011.144 The Commission attributes this improvement 
to “improvements in network performance” rather than downward adjustment on advertised 
speeds, noting that there was a 38 percent increase in average speeds delivered to customers.145 
Peak-time performance varies somewhat based upon technology. During peak periods fiber-
based networks such as FiOS delivered 117 percent of advertised download speeds, while cable-
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based services delivered 99 percent of advertised speeds and DSL-based services lagged behind, 
at just 84 percent of advertised speeds.146 
Of course, this does not suggest that congestion is never a problem for fixed broadband 
networks. In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission sanctioned Comcast Corporation 
for throttling traffic between users operating peer-to-peer networks.147 Comcast claimed 
throttling was necessary because these networks created an unexpected spike in demand for 
upload bandwidth, which imposed congestion costs on other consumers who shared upload 
bandwidth with someone operating a peer-to-peer network.148 One can also infer some level of 
network congestion from the rise of the Content Delivery Network (CDN) industry. Significant 
content providers such as Netflix rely on third-party CDNs such as Akamai and Level 3 
Technologies to deliver their services.149 CDNs store multiple copies of a content provider’s data 
in locations across the country, and carry that data over their privately owned networks rather 
than the public Internet to a location on the broadband provider’s network closest to the 
consumer. Netflix and other content providers would not pay CDNs to carry their data unless 
congestion on the public Internet made this an undesirable alternative. More generally, Say’s 
Law suggests that any installed capacity will eventually become saturated: greater network 
capacity drives greater demand for bandwidth-intensive applications that the additional capacity 
makes possible.150 This suggests that congestion may be managed or brought into equilibrium for 
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a time, but supports the idea that congestion can be a legitimate factor in pricing determinations 
for broadband providers. 
Congestion is a much more significant issue for wireless providers.151 As Commission 
Chairman Genachowski and many commentators note, the smartphone revolution has unleashed 
tremendous demand for wireless applications and services. While wireless providers are 
investing billions of dollars to upgrade and expand network capacity, neither these efforts nor 
spectrum policy has been able to match that demand.152 Industry analyst Peter Rysavy notes that 
the bandwidth-intensive mobile applications such as streaming video are “growing 
tremendously, and it’s unclear how long operators will be able to keep up. In the absence of new 
spectrum, which does not seem to be materializing fast enough . . . the result will be networks 
running at capacity.”153 Given these dynamics, Rysavy concludes that “congestion is 
inevitable.”154 
C. Usage-Based Pricing as a Congestion Management Tool 
Although usage-based pricing encourages more efficient network consumption generally, 
many question its usefulness for alleviating congestion specifically. While data caps and tiered 
pricing have become the dominant usage-based pricing strategies in the marketplace thus far,155 
they are rather crude tools for addressing network congestion.156 Data caps limit the amount of 
bandwidth that a customer uses each month. While this limit reduces overall traffic on the 
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network, it does not directly target traffic during congestion periods. This is the equivalent of 
trying to solve rush-hour highway congestion by placing a limit on the number of miles each 
driver can drive each month. The cap may have some indirect effect on congestion, if heavy 
users choose to reduce consumption by reducing peak-time use. But the cap also targets heavy 
users who generate huge volumes of traffic during off-peak periods (for example, by backing up 
systems at 2:00 a.m.), whose uses generate virtually no congestion costs.157 For this reason, 
Sandvine estimates that “monthly usage quotas have only a limited impact, if any at all, on peak 
network demand.”158  
If feasible, peak-time pricing could be a more effective usage-based strategy to alleviate 
congestion.159 When facing rush-hour traffic congestion, London famously began charging 
commuters a fee to drive in the busiest part of town during peak times, which has reduced 
congestion by 30 percent.160 For many years, peak pricing was a staple of long-distance and 
wireless telephone service, to drive traffic toward nights and weekends when networks were less 
congested.161 In broadband, a metered rate that charges customers more for peak-time use might 
similarly encourage customers to shift peak-time activities to less expensive off-peak hours.162  
But it may be difficult to identify predictable periods of congestion and communicate that 
clearly to consumers. This may be possible for fixed broadband. Although the consensus is not 
universal, most analysts generally agree with the Federal Communications Commission that 
fixed broadband networks experience consistent peaks on weekdays between 7:00 p.m. and 
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11:00 p.m., which coincides with the time that consumers return home from work and consume 
bandwidth-heavy applications such as streaming video.163 As a result, a primetime premium may 
be a feasible solution to alleviate future fixed broadband congestion, assuming traffic patterns do 
not change as network use rises. But there is much less consensus regarding wireless congestion 
periods. Wireless customers vary widely in their data consumption habits. With the rise of 
wireless video, network optimization Bytemobile notes that “mobile networks are under constant 
strain for the majority of the day.”164 Systems can monitor network load and automatically raise 
prices when they detect congestion, but unless these periods are easily understood and predicted 
by consumers, they are unlikely to affect consumer behavior.165  
IV. Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Usage-Based Pricing 
While there are many potential benefits that flow from usage-based pricing, some critics 
do not trust the practice because of a fear of anticompetitive harm. These commentators fear that 
broadband providers may adopt data caps to achieve an unfair economic advantage in the video 
market. They note that “in the United States Internet service providers are almost always also in 
the pay-television business,” which competes against Internet-based video providers such as 
Netflix and Hulu.166 Comcast estimates that the amount of data required to replace its cable 
service with an Internet-based competitor would be 288 gigabytes each month—a figure 
suspiciously close to Comcast’s proposed 300-gigabyte monthly cap. Given the incentive to 
discriminate, critics allege that data caps serve primarily “to protect [broadband providers’] 
legacy, linear video distribution models from emerging online video competition.”167 
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A. Data Caps as a Vertical Restraint on Trade 
These are valid concerns, although they come with some caveats. For many consumers, 
over-the-top video providers like Netflix are complements rather than substitutes to traditional 
cable: they offer an alternative slate of entertainment choices but do not replicate the specific 
channels and programs that cable offers. Cable industry analyst James Ratcliffe explains that 
subscription rates remain high because “pay TV continues to provide customers with the content 
they want, a lot of which isn't available outside the traditional pay environment,” such as live 
sporting events.168 Moreover, many broadband providers (particularly DSL and wireless 
providers) do not deliver cable service, and not all who do (like Verizon) have adopted data caps. 
Nonetheless, the Commission has correctly found that vertically integrated broadband providers 
“have incentives to interfere with the operation of” Internet-based competitors.169 These 
integrated companies wish to keep as many customers as possible enrolled in the “triple-play” 
bundle of voice, video, and data service, because it increases overall revenues, spreads the 
common costs of the network more widely, and can thus minimize the cost of each network 
service.  
But regulatory intervention requires more than a showing that a vertically integrated firm 
has incentives to take actions that might harm competitors. The firm must also have the ability to 
do so. Antitrust law subjects almost all vertical restraints to the rule of reason, which makes these 
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restraints actionable only if the firm has market power.170 Without market power, a firm cannot 
maintain anticompetitive conduct, because customers will defect. If consumers in a competitive 
market wish to use Netflix and find that one company’s data caps prevent them from doing so, 
those consumers will move to another broadband provider.171 If no provider offers uncapped 
service, over time one provider is likely to change its policies to meet this pent-up demand. 
Although analysts dispute the precise level of competition in fixed broadband markets,172 
Gregory Sidak and David Teece are probably correct that “the market for broadband access is 
both highly rivalrous and workably (even if not perfectly) competitive.”173 The Commission 
notes that 82 percent of American census tracts have at least two competitive options for fixed 
broadband service.174 Of course, in most places this means two options: the telephone company 
and the cable company. Susan Crawford notes that because of cable’s recent upgrade to DOCSIS 
3.0, a new standard that boosts performance of cable-based data transmission, cable companies 
offer speeds far greater than copper-based DSL service.175 Alfred Kahn, the late dean of 
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regulated utilities law, has explained that “there is no consensus among economists about the 
likely sufficiency of competition under duopoly.”176 But Sidak and Teece cite data suggesting 
annualized churn rates between 29 and 36 percent, which suggests that a sizeable number of 
customers do change broadband providers each year.177 AT&T adopted a no-term service 
contract option in 2008, advertising it as service “without the hassle of a term commitment like 
those of cable companies.”178 Most of the industry quickly followed suit, which tends to show 
both that the firms compete and that switching costs are falling. The cable industry’s deployment 
of DOCSIS 3.0 also evinces a desire to gain a competitive edge over Verizon and AT&T, which 
might not have happened if the companies had market power and thus felt no need to respond to 
telephone-based competition.  
Competition will increase if wireless broadband matures into a legitimate third alternative 
to fixed broadband providers, just as satellite rose as an intermodal competitor to traditional 
cable service. Many services available over fixed broadband networks are also available over 
wireless broadband; the gating factor is the capacity of wireless networks to offer these services 
at the same scale and speed as today’s cable and telephone companies. 
Opponents must also show that data caps harm consumers. Netflix can argue, and has 
argued, that data caps are a threat to its existing business model.179 But the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly reminded litigants that the antitrust laws were passed for “the protection of 
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competition, not competitors.”180 Like price discrimination, vertical restraints have ambiguous 
effects on consumer welfare.181 Some vertical restraints “give rise to competitive foreclosure 
concerns,” but most are procompetitive because they “generate significant efficiencies and 
enhance consumer welfare.”182 For example, when AT&T entered into an exclusive vertical 
agreement with Apple to distribute the iPhone, the wireless provider received a significant 
competitive advantage over Verizon and other competitors.183 But this was undeniably good for 
consumers: it woke up a sleepy smartphone market, as AT&T advertised the product for which it 
paid so dearly, and Verizon began working with Google to develop the rival Android platform as 
a competitive alternative. 
As discussed above, broadband operators can offer several procompetitive justifications 
for data caps. Caps allow firms to shift more network costs onto heavier users, which can expand 
service to light users who cannot afford the higher uniform flat rate.184 And they encourage 
consumers, content providers, and broadband providers themselves to use network resources 
more efficiently.185 As critics point out, caps could also deter customers from canceling cable 
service in favor of Internet-based video options. This is harmful to that subset of consumers who 
subscribe to both broadband and cable and would cancel cable but for the data cap. But it could 
benefit those customers who subscribe only to broadband service: because cable and broadband 
service share common network costs, a shrinking base of cable subscribers would force the 
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company to recover those costs by raising broadband rates.186 The net effect of the practice is 
difficult to determine with certainty, meaning that the anticompetitive case is not as simple or 
obvious as some critics assert. 
Perhaps for this reason, several antitrust scholars have surmised that the Department of 
Justice is unlikely to find that data caps are anticompetitive. Harry First notes that “all these 
cable companies are really facing big competition from the telcos” and “if the consumer can just 
switch, then it’s not exclusionary and bad business.”187 Similarly, Herbert Hovenkamp notes that 
“if it’s simply data caps . . . that’s a tougher antitrust case to make because public utilities have a 
legitimate interest in preventing overuse of their assets, particularly if other people’s access is 
being limited as a result . . . There’s a legitimate claim on the part of the Internet providers that 
staged pricing or caps are reasonable.”188 First further explained that the agency’s case likely 
depends on whether it can find evidence of collusion among broadband providers: “if they make 
these decisions unilaterally about how they’re going to price downloading from the Internet 
individually, that’s not going to exclude these Internet rivals.”189 These comments echo the 
conclusions of a 2007 Federal Trade Commission study, which found that it is “difficult to find 
evidence that vertical controls reduce welfare” and that “optimal policy places a heavy burden on 
plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive.”190 
This analysis highlights the importance of case-by-case adjudication of allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct. One cannot say as a general matter that data caps and other forms of 
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usage-based pricing are inherently anticompetitive. The effect they have on competition turns 
upon a fact-sensitive inquiry into the broadband provider’s market power, and quantification of 
the impact that the pricing strategy has on different segments of the provider’s customer base.  
B. The Xfinity-Xbox Dispute 
First and Hovenkamp suggested that the Justice Department may have an easier time 
challenging Comcast’s specific practice of exempting Xfinity app use from its data cap when 
watched through the Xbox video game console, while subjecting Netflix and other like services 
to the normally applied data cap.191 Their conclusions stem from Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
congressional testimony suggesting that this practice may violate a condition that the Justice 
Department placed upon Comcast’s 2011 merger with NBC Universal.192 First wondered if the 
general investigation “was generated out of a concern that Comcast is violating the decree they 
entered into.”193 
But setting aside any special provisions attached to the Comcast merger, it is unlikely that 
the Xbox issue actually violates general antitrust principles. Comcast offers a service known as 
Xfinity On Demand, which is available for Xfinity cable subscribers to watch on television using 
a traditional cable box.194 Customers who subscribe to both Xfinity cable service and Comcast 
broadband service may also access Xfinity On Demand using the Xfinity App on Microsoft’s 
Xbox 360 video game console, which is connected to the television and the Internet. When a 
customer chooses to access Xfinity On Demand via the Xfinity App, the data used to view the 
service is exempt from the customer’s monthly cap—even though other content viewed through 
the Xbox, such as Netflix, continues to count against the cap. 
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Although at first blush this arrangement appears discriminatory, it is hard to show any 
consumer harm because of the way the offer is structured. The exemption flows from 
Microsoft’s ongoing efforts to market the Xbox as an alternative to a traditional cable set-top 
box. The Xfinity App is only available to customers who subscribe to Comcast’s cable service, 
and the exemption only applies when the customer views Xfinity On Demand content on the 
customer’s television through the Xbox. Accessing the Xfinity App on a computer or tablet 
would incur data use subject to the cap. Ultimately, this means only that existing Xfinity cable 
customers are free to use an Xbox in lieu of a traditional cable box to view On Demand content. 
Netflix may complain that the exemption leads Comcast customers to watch Xfinity rather than 
Netflix content using the Xbox, because Xfinity content does not incur data charges. But 
importantly, a customer may already do this regardless of the exemption, simply by tuning in to 
traditional cable.  
From the consumer’s standpoint, therefore, the exemption is merely a matter of 
convenience. Traditional cable consumption on television does not count toward monthly data 
limits, and no one seems to be suggesting that it should. The Xbox exemption merely allows 
customers to watch traditional cable consumption on television using the Xbox rather than a 
traditional set-top box as the conduit. This innovation is proconsumer, in that it gives consumers 
a choice of receivers for their television and perhaps allows some consumers to avoid Comcast’s 
monthly set-top box rental fees. But it should have little effect on a consumer’s marginal choice 
to watch Xfinity or Netflix content, because the consumer already gets cap-exempt Xfinity 
programming through the cable system. Thus, while at first blush this dispute looks like an 
example of the potential ills of data caps, ultimately the issue does little to undermine the 
potential benefits of experimenting with various forms of usage-based pricing. 
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C. Data Caps and Market Power 
The antitrust analysis of data caps in Section IV.A suggests that critics’ opposition to data 
caps is somewhat misplaced. The real threat to consumer welfare is not usage-based pricing, but 
market power. After all, a firm with market power can exploit consumers whether it relies on 
usage-based pricing or flat-rate pricing. A broadband provider with market power that wishes to 
offset lost cable revenue through additional broadband revenue need not use data caps to deter or 
punish video cord-cutters. It could simply raise standalone flat-rate broadband prices to punish 
those who do not also purchase cable service. And any broadband provider lacking market power 
could not gouge customers under either scenario, because affected consumers would simply take 
their business elsewhere. 
As the Commission noted, vertically integrated firms often have incentives to leverage 
power in one market to improve their position in another market. The Madison River 
investigation is a testament to this possibility. Madison River Communications paid a $15,000 
fine to the Commission in 2005 to settle allegations that it blocked third-party Voice-over-
Internet-Protocol (VoIP) services from operating on its network, because these VoIP services 
competed against Madison River’s traditional telephone network.195 Regulators should remain 
vigilant with regard to potentially anticompetitive conduct, but they should also heed antitrust 
law’s lesson that many vertical restraints are procompetitive, and absent market power, 
consumers can punish those that are not without help from the Justice Department.  
Therefore, while there are risks that usage-based pricing can become a tool for 
anticompetitive conduct, this does not undermine the potential benefits of allowing firms to 
experiment with the practice. There may be significant consumer benefits that flow from data 
caps and other forms of usage-based pricing. And when a pricing change adversely affects 
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consumers, usually they can punish this behavior by switching providers. Regulatory 
enforcement should usually step in only if a company has wielded market power in a way that 
causes actual harm to consumers. As a result, any enforcement should take the form of ex post 
adjudication of specific harmful conduct, rather than ex ante prohibitions on pricing tools that 
help broadband providers improve the efficiency of the network. 
V. The Importance of Transparency 
To temper the concerns addressed above, and alleviate the concerns of both critics and 
consumers about the introduction and use of data caps, providers should clearly communicate to 
the public any changes in practices. On a basic level, this transparency is mandated by the 
Federal Communications Commission’s Open Internet Order. The order requires that  
a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall 
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management 
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access 
services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such 
services and for content, application, service, and device providers to develop, 
market, and maintain Internet offerings.196 
 
Clear disclosure of a firm’s network management practices, including its billing practices, is an 
integral component of robust competition.197 Customers can compare different broadband 
providers only if they have an accurate description of each firm’s value proposition. Clear 
disclosure also puts content and application providers on notice of potential ways that these 
practices affect their customers’ behavior, so they can adjust their business models 
accordingly.198 
But disclosure of billing terms is not the only way the firm should communicate its plans 
to consumers. As Odlyzko notes, consumers prefer flat rates to metered rates, in part because 
                                                 
196 In re Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17937 ¶ 54 (2010). 
197 Id. at 17936. 
198 Id. 
47 
 
they tend to overestimate their monthly data consumption and because of the mental transaction 
costs of making decisions under a metered regime.199 Unlike minutes on a long-distance plan, 
megabytes are difficult units for consumers to conceptualize. But to achieve efficiency gains 
from usage-based pricing, a network provider must assure that its users generally understand 
how much data each online transaction consumes. To migrate successfully to usage-based prices 
without adversely affecting its reputation with customers, the provider should take steps to 
correct this overestimation and convince users that they are better off with usage-based pricing.  
Graber suggests sending customers a bill comparing their flat-rate pricing with a 
hypothetical usage-based bill that shows both total use and potential savings under the new 
plan.200 Providers might also circulate fliers on a regular basis noting the average amount of data 
consumed by popular activities, like Comcast did when it first adopted a data cap in 2008. As 
data consumption enters the zeitgeist, Internet content and application providers may also meet 
consumer demand by providing estimates of how much data individual actions might consume. 
Application developers in Apple’s App Store and the Google Play Store routinely say how large 
each application is, so the consumer understands how much storage space the program will 
consume on the consumer’s device. The market for Internet content and applications may 
ultimately evolve to provide similar information about consumption when possible. 
Finally, providers need to make it easy for consumers to check their monthly data use. 
Most providers that have adopted usage-based pricing already make this information readily 
available to consumers through an application on the consumer’s device or a web-based 
interface. Many also provide emails or text messages warning customers when monthly use 
begins to approach certain limits (such as a data cap). The prevalence of these tools shows that 
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they are both feasible to provide and popular with consumers. Any firm considering usage-based 
pricing should make them available to consumers once the transition is complete. 
VI. Conclusion 
Ultimately, data caps and other pricing strategies are ways that broadband companies can 
distinguish themselves from one another to achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
When firms experiment with different business models, they can tailor services to niche 
audiences whose interests are inadequately satisfied by a one-size-fits-all flat-rate plan. Absent 
anticompetitive concerns, public policy should encourage companies to experiment with 
different pricing models as a way to compete against one another. 
As Christopher Yoo has noted, the trend toward more experimentation with different 
pricing and business models in telecommunications mirrors a greater trend toward 
experimentation and ex post oversight in antitrust law generally. Usage-based pricing can be a 
useful tool for broadband providers to create differentiation in the marketplace by spreading 
network costs in new ways and can promote greater efficiency by consumers, content providers, 
and the network operator itself. Only through experimentation and empirical measurement will 
providers find the optimal pricing solution—which may vary dramatically by network. 
Regulators have correctly rejected the call to interfere with this pricing flexibility absent a 
showing of market failure and consumer harm. The newest move to data caps should not provide 
the impetus to deviate from that reasoned stance.  
